Abstract
The authors investigate the effect of managers' perceptions of two types of transaction-specific investments on their intention to terminate a current interorganizational relationship: (1) the specific knowledge necessary for a manufacturer's representative (rep) to carry out the selling function for a given manufacturer and (2) the specific knowledge reps acquire about their own customer accounts. The extent to which the length of prior relationship strengthens or weakens the hypothesized linkages is also examined. The authors test the hypotheses within the context of distribution channels (i.e., between a manufacturer and its selling agent), which are characteristic of many vertical organizational relationships. The results replicate in an additional setting some prior findings on the influence of transaction-specific investments between two parties directly involved in a relationship. The authors also find that specialized investments by a downstream partner (i.e., a manufacturer's rep) in relationships that are even farther downstream (i.e., customer accounts) can influence a manufacturer's intention to terminate the manufacturer-rep relationship. Moreover, the length of prior relationship between a manufacturer and its rep is shown to moderate this effect. (Transaction Cost Theory; Interorganizational Relationships; Trust) One of the interesting phenomena in the domain of organizational activity is interorganizational relationships (Oliver 1990 ). An important question for firms that enter into such relationships is whether to continue or terminate them. Why some firms continue and others terminate interorganizational relationships has been a subject of both theoretical and empirical research (e.g., John 1990, Levinthal and Fichman 1988) . Underlying much of this work is transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985) , which holds that relationships are maintained because the parties invest in relationship-specific capital. By this view, relationship-specific investments make the exchange partners costly to replace, which in turn cements the interorganizational relationship (Williamson 1983) and makes it less likely to be terminated. However, current research using transaction cost theory posits that voluntary adoption of standards of behavior (e.g., Noreen 1988) , mutual cooperation (e.g., Hill 1990 Hill , 1995 , and enlightened self-interest and trust (e.g., Jones 1995) may mitigate this effect.
Previous research on the continuity of interorganizational relationships has concentrated only on the transaction-specific investments between the two parties directly involved in the relationship. Many vertical interfirm relationships, however, represent connections between two links in a chain of possible relationships. For example, in the context of industrial distribution channels, a manufacturer and its sales agent may have an ongoing relationship in which the sales agent has the opportunity to establish a relationship with its own customer accounts (Heide and John 1988) . A downstream partner (i.e., the sales agent) is thereby able to make additional transaction-specific investments in relationships that are even farther downstream. In these cases, two different types of transaction-specific investments might arise: manufacturer-specific assets and customer-specific assets. Is the continuity of an interorganizational relationship differentially affected by these different types of transactionspecific investments?
In an empirical study, we examined the effect of managers' perceptions of the two types of transaction-specific investments on their intention to terminate a current interorganizational relationship. We also examined to what extent, if any, the length of prior relationship strengthens or weakens this effect. To measure the theoretical variables, we used the key informant method employed in several previous studies of economic activity ( e .~. , ~n d e r s o n and Schmittlein 1984, Heide and ~i n e r 1992, John et al. 1987 , John and Weitz 1988 , Walker and Poppo 1991 .
The next section briefly describes the interorganizational relationship context of our inquiry. Then we provide theoretical background and develop specific research hypotheses. We continue with a description of an empirical test of the theoretical hypotheses in the context of the relationship between electronics manufacturing firms and independent sales representatives. Finally, the results and limitations of the study are discussed.
The Selling Function and Interorganizational Relationships
A brief description of the specific exchange relation used as the basis of our theoretical discussion provides an understanding of the types of relationship-oriented investments generally present in that context. We note that the hypotheses we developed may be idiosyncratic to this particular setting and hence may not be generalizable to other interorganizational relationships.
One of the important strategic questions facing a firm is who should provide the selling services for the markets in which it operates. In any given market, firms use an employee (i.e., "direct") salesforce and/or an indirect sales agency Schmittlein 1984, John and Weitz 1988) , sometimes known as a manufacturer's representative (rep),' to carry out this selling function. Manufacturers that use an indirect sales agency essentially establish a relationship with an independent organization.
The variety of pressures inherent in the relationship between a manufacturer and a rep are characteristic of those in a wide range of interorganizational relationships. For example, the manufacturer has an interest in coordinating the rep's activities to be coincident with its marketing objectives. This interest ranges from how the product is presented to the rep's accounts to the nature of call patterns and service provision. At the same time, the rep may have an interest in maintaining a unique identity with its accounts. Because such interests and activities take time to coordinate effectively, they may give rise to uncertainty in the exchange process (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . The exchange process is characterized by further uncertainty because of the evolutionary nature of how a manufacturer might serve a sales district. In particular, as a manufacturer and its market change, the appropriate configuration of the selling function changes. These pressures suggest a precarious foundation for a long-lasting relationship between a manufacturer and its rep.
Hypotheses
Two types of transaction-specific investments that arise in the manufacturer-rep relationship contextmanufacturer-specific assets and customer-specific assets-are hypothesized to influence a manufacturer's intention to terminate the relationship; the length of prior relationship is hypothesized to affect these linkages.
Transaction-Specific Assets and the Termination of Interorganizational Relationships
Organizational researchers have noted that the investments made by the parties help to cement the relationship. Such investments may promote exchange and increase the commitment between the partners (Blau 1964 , Cook and Emerson 1978 , Emerson 1962 , Klein et al. 1978 . However, as emphasized by organizational economists, not all investments increase the commitment between the exchange partners. Only investments that represent credible commitments support continuing exchange Leffler 1981, Williamson 1983) . They can be characterized by the degree to which they are transaction specific, that is, idiosyncratic to the exchange and nonredeployable in other exchanges. Such assets increase the switching costs of replacing an exchange partner (Barney and Ouchi 1986) Although several types of transaction-specific investments can be identified (e.g., physical assets, site-specific assets), the most common transaction-specific capital in the context of a manufacturer-rep relationship is specialized human assets Schmittlein 1984, John and Weitz 1988) . The most prominent example is the specific knowledge necessary for a manufacturer's rep to carry out the selling function for a given manufacturer. It includes special-purpose knowledge, such as knowledge about a manufacturer's product line and specialized selling techniques, as well as investments in working relationships with the manufacturer (Anderson and Schmittlein 1984) .
Many of these specialized human assets are acquired through "learning-by-doing" processes (Stinchcombe 1965 , Williamson 1975 and therefore take time to acquire. One might argue that the length of prior relationship is therefore a reasonable surrogate for the acquired level of manufacturer-specific assets (e.g., longer prior relationships are characterized by higher levels of manufacturer-specific assets). A central argument in our research, however, is that organizations, and reps in particular, differ in terms of how quickly learning takes place (Huber 1991) and/or in the effort made to acquire manufacturer-specific assets. One rep might quickly gain a relatively high level of manufacturer-specific knowledge whereas another rep might slowly acquire a relatively low level of manufacturer-specific knowledge. For example, there is variation in terms of how much time reps devote to selling a manufacturer's individual product rather than building that manufacturer's product line. The latter requires much more investment in manufacturerspecific knowledge. That the acquisition of specialized knowledge and slulls is not necessarily correlated with time is also suggested by Williamson (1985, p. 21 1) . We therefore propose that the length of prior relationship is conceptually distinct from the level of manufacturerspecific assets invested in the relationship. Our empirical test provides evidence that our measures of these two contmcts are distinct.
Transaction cost analysis indicates that a rep's investment in manufacturer-specific assets loses its value to both parties if the relationship is terminated (Williamson 1975) . For example, the rep may invest effort to gain a unique understanding of how the manufacturer operates in order to sell that manufacturer's products more effectively. This investment is nonsalvageable to the rep. If the relationship were terminated, the rep would incur the switching costs of learning the specifics of another manufacturer's business. Similarly, the manufacturer that benefited from the rep's transaction-specific investment would incur the cost of finding a new rep willing and able to make similar idiosyncratic investments (Anderson and Schmittlein 1984) . Hence, the rep's investment in manufacturer-specific assets may promote continuance of the relationship, because termination of the relationship would cause both parties to incur substantial switching costs. To the extent the rep invests in manufacturerspecific assets, the manufacturer will seek to continue the interorganizational relationship (Williamson 1983,199 1 Two points are noteworthy here. First, past studies have demonstrated that, de novo, manufacturers tend to terminate interfirm relationships and integrate forward in situations wherein heavy transaction-specific investments will be appropriate for salespeople and distributors (Anderson 1985 , Anderson and Coughlan 1987 , Coughlan 1985 , John and Weitz 1988 , Klein et al. 1990 , Lilien 1979 ). Those studies reflect Williamson's (1985) focus on the manufacturer anticipating small-numbers bargaining and avoiding it. In contrast, our study concerns manufacturers that already sell through independent sales agencies. In these circumstances, as H1 implies, putting specific assets in place tends to cement the current form of selling (see also Weiss and Anderson 1992) .
Second, this hypothesis is consistent with the findings in recent empirical studies of buyer-supplier relationships. For example, Heide and John (1990) found that expectations of continuing interactions between buyers and suppliers were related positively to the supplier's investments in buyer-specific assets. Joskow (1985) studied contracts between coal suppliers and buyers and showed that transaction-specific investments influenced the use of contracts with longer formal duration. Empirical support for H1 would help to generalize these findings to the context of manufacturers and their reps.
In a manufacturer-rep relationship, a rep may also invest in specialized assets with its own customer accounts. These customer-specific investments can take the form of building close, personal relationships or employing other bonding actions with the accounts. They are characteristic of many vertical organizational relationships that give a downstream partner an opportunity to make investments in relationships even farther downstream. Transaction cost reasoning suggests that a rep's investment in customer-specific assets reduces the manufacturer's ability to replace the income derived from the rep (Dutta et al. 1995) . Essentially, if the rep were terminated, the manufacturer would lose customer accounts that had bonded with the rep (Heide and John 1988). The manufacturer therefore would tend to continue the established relationship because terminating it would result in substantial switching costs (Williamson 1985) .
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HYPOTHESIS 2. All other things being equal, increases in the level of the rep's customer-specific assets decrease the likelihood of the manufacturer terminating the relationship.
The Moderating Effects of the Length of Prior Relationship
The effects predicted in the first two hypotheses are based on the presence of relationship-specific investments that influence the manufacturer's potential switching costs, which in turn affect the manufacturer's likelihood of terminating the relationship. We now argue that under certain conditions the length of prior relationship may also affect the manufacturer's potential switching costs. That is, the effects in the first two hypotheses are moderated by the length of the manufacturer-rep relationship.
Organizational researchers have argued that the longer an interorganizational relationship continues, the greater is the opportunity for experience-based benefits to accrue (Hannan and Freeman 1984) . We contend that these benefits are particularly likely in the presence of manufacturerspecific investments because the mutual or symmetric dependence created by such investments aligns the parties' interests and provides an incentive for each to engage in a process of mutual adjustments (Thompson 1967) . The benefits of a mutual adjustment process should be more apparent in older than in newer relationships because the parties have had more opportunity to adapt to the demands of the relationship. For instance, when the parties are mutually dependent, older relationships should have clearer and more efficient communication, greater trust, more flexibility, and/or increased commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1989 , MacNeil 1978 , 1980 , Ouchi 1979 . To the extent that manufacturers value those advantages, older relationships in the presence of manufacturerspecific investments should increase the manufacturer's switching costs of terminating the relationship.
By this reasoning, we hypothesized that increases in manufacturer-specific assets have a greater impact on the likelihood of continuation for relationships of relatively longer prior duration than for those of shorter duration.
HYPOTHESIS 3. All other things being equal, increases in the level of the rep's investment in manufacturer-speciJic assets decrease the likelihood of the manufacturer terminating the relationship for manufacturer-rep relationships of relatively longer prior duration.
Consider next that increases in the rep's customerspecific assets increase the manufacturer's dependence on the rep (Heide and John 1988) . In contrast, such assets do not create a similar dependence for the rep. The reason ORGANIZATION SCIENCE NO^. 8, NO. 6, is that the rep's investments in customer-specific assets are redeployable in relationships with other manufacturers. Such asymmetric dependence can weaken efforts to develop a bilateral pattern of interaction (Oliver 1990 ). Here, one party (i.e., the rep) has less incentive than the other to engage in a process of mutual adjustments. This situation can be contrasted with that underlying H3 in which mutually dependent parties have a collective incentive to engage in mutual adjustments.
Lack of a bilateral pattern of interaction between a manufacturer and its rep can be evident in several ways. For example, asymmetric dependence can result in more manifest conflict and less cooperation (Dwyer et al. 1987) , reduced flexibility in response to changing circumstances (Heide 1994), and increased levels of opportunistic behaviors (Williamson 199 1). Relationship problems associated with asymmetric dependence may eventually become more apparent as events unfold because one partner has had more opportunity to find out the extent to which the other partner is willing to adjust to the relationship. For example, a manufacturer may eventually find out that its rep, rather than negotiating adjustments with the manufacturer, is devoting more and more time to selling the product lines of other manufacturers. Similarly, the manufacturer has little incentive to show flexibility because it has no guarantee that such actions will be reciprocated in the future (Heide 1994) . In this context the manufacturer's opportunity costs associated with negotiating and ongoing haggling with the rep (Joskow 1985) may increase over time. If so, other things being equal, relationships of longer prior duration in the presence of customer-specific investments may actually decrease the manufacturer's switching costs of terminating the relationship.
Therefore, we hypothesized that increases in customerspecific assets have a greater impact on the likelihood of termination for relationships of longer prior duration than for those of shorter prior duration.
HYPOTHESIS 4. All other things being equal, increases in the level of the rep's investment in customerspecific assets increase the likelihood of the manufacturer terminating the relationship for manufacturer-rep relationships of relatively longer prior duration.
Note that this prediction is not entirely clear-cut. Conceivably, a condition of asymmetric dependence can increase or have no effect on the manufacturer's switching costs as events unfold. Asymmetric dependence may temper or override opportunistic tendencies and encourage cooperation (Grundlach and Cadotte 1994) , which may in the long run result in strong ties (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1989) and effective coordination of exchange relationships (e.g., Frazier and Rody 199 1). However, given that the customer-specific investments reduce the manufacturer's ability to exercise control because of the dependence they create (Heide and John 1992), the hypothesized outcome seems more likely.
Empirical Study
Research Design
The four hypotheses were tested with perceptual data as part of another study of industrial manufacturing channels in the electronic components industry (Weiss and Anderson 1992) . Specifically, the focus was on the interorganizational relationship between a manufacturer of electronic components and its rep. Such reps are separate organizations used by manufacturers to carry out the selling function. This interorganizational relationship is a good context for assessing the hypotheses because there is considerable variation in the level of transactionspecific investments made by the various parties (Anderson and Schmittlein 1984) , variation in the duration of current relationships (Anderson and Weitz 1989) , and many instances of manufacturers changing relationships (either by changing reps or by vertically integrating the selling function).
Briefly, the sample was obtained with the cooperation of two trade associations (Semiconductor Industry Association and Electronics Industry Association) and a major industry publication (Electronic Business). A random sample of 1,209 companies known to use reps was drawn from the two associations' mailing lists. Data were collected by the key informant method, which has been employed in other, similar studies of organizational-level decisions (e.g., Miner 1992, Walker and Poppo 1991) .
A preliminary version of a questionnaire that operationalized the theoretical variables was first administered personally to district sales managers for six different manufacturers. These district sales managers are the manufacturer's liaison with the rep in a particular district and are in a strong position to indicate the firm's intention because they are the manufacturer's primary source of information about both the rep and the district. How the district sales manager views the rep is of critical importance in determining the future of the rep's relationship with the manufacturer (Gibbons 1988) . Among industry observers, the power of the district sales manager to influence the organization's view of and decisions about the rep is well known (Lebell 1974) . Hence, these individuals are knowledgeable and influential decision makers, satisfying Campbell's (1955) criteria for organizational informants. The pretest revealed that they could easily respond to the measures in the survey instrument. In particular, they had no problem answering questions about the length of prior relationship with the rep in their district or decision making pertaining to future relations with the rep.
After the pretest, district sales managers for each manufacturer in the sample frame were contacted by telephone and asked to participate in the study. Callbacks and a followup mailing resulted in 258 responses. As 143 of the 1,209 firms were subsequently identified as out of business, the response rate was estimated to be 24%. This response rate is similar to those in other large-scale surveys of distribution channel relationships (e.g., Heide and Miner 1992), yet is low enough to consider the research somewhat exploratory. A comparison of the mean size (as measured by the number of employees) of the firms represented in the sample with the mean size of all firms in the same SIC codes revealed no significant differences. Further, to assess the possibility of nonresponse bias in the data, a formal test was conducted by comparing early with late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977) . The two groups were compared on the basis of several descriptive variables, including the age of the firm, how long the firm had operated in the chosen sales territory, and how long the chosen rep had been in business. As no significant differences were found between these groups, nonresponse bias may not be a significant problem.
The questionnaire asked the respondent to choose one specific rep organization in the district for which the sales manager was responsible. Responses to all questions were made with reference to this chosen rep organization and its corresponding sales district. On a random basis, a respondent received a questionnaire that asked himher to choose a rep that was one of the poorer, midrange, or best performers. Accordingly, equal numbers of questionnaires were sent out in the three performance categories (poor, midrange, or best). This procedure helped ensure sufficient variation on the dependent variables. Of the 258 returned questionnaires, 90 focused on a poorerperforming rep, 84 on a midrange rep, and 84 on a bestperforming rep. These are approximately the same proportions (i.e., equal) used in the mailing.
Measures
We followed Nunnally's (1978) guidelines in developing all items and pretesting them for clarity and appropriateness on a pretest sample of district sales managers. Multiitem scales designed to tap a common construct showed satisfactory evidence of internal consistency as measured by Cronbach's alpha. Specifically, all multi-item measures surpassed Nunnally's suggested minimum reliability of 0.7 for basic research. Table 1 gives the texts of the multi-item scales. 
GOD1
0.90 It his highly likely that we will replace this rep with a company salesforce in the near future. I fully expect that we will replace this rep with a direct salesforce. Sometime within the next two years, it is a realistic possibility that a company sales force will replace this rep. We will convert this territory to a direct salesforce in the near future. We intend to be doing most of our sales in this territory through our own salespeople within the next two years. A company sales force is not in our current plans for this territory (reverse-scored).
FLIPREP Sometime within the next two years, a different rep firm is a realistic possibility for this sales territory. We are actively shopping around for another rep in this territory. We are taking a good hard look at other rep firms that might be suitable for our line. In this district, we intend to do our sales through a different rep within the next two years.
MANU F 0.88 This rep has spent a lot of time
and effort learning special selling techniques needed to sell our product. Our rep spent a lot of time coming to know our product line. Our rep has acquired a great deal of specialized information about our products and how to sell them effectively. Likelihood of Terminating the Relationship. An important consideration in operationalizing this variable is that manufacturers typically terminate the relationship with their reps in two ways: by changing to a different rep or by dispensing with the rep and setting up a direct salesforce. During the pretest phase of our research, we found that a f i r m may not necessarily view termination as an either-or question. A firm may decide to terminate the current interorganizational (rep) relationship, yet proceed for some time before malung a final decision about exactly how the selling function will ultimately be organized. As a result, a firm may indicate that it is interested in both switching reps and going direct. We therefore needed a general measure of the likelihood of relationship termination that would be sensitive to this possibility
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without penalizing firms for being more decisive. Our strategy was to first measure each of these "intentions to terminate" separately and subsequently combine them into a final measure of the likelihood of terminating the relationship.
The manufacturer's likelihood of changing to a different manufacturers' representative was assessed by computing the average response to a four-item scale (FLIP-REP) tapping the manufacturer's seriousness about switching reps in the sales territory in the near term (extensive pretesting indicated that this could be operationalized as two years or less). The manufacturer's likelihood of setting up a direct salesforce was measured on a six-item scale (GODI) developed by Weiss and Anderson (1992) . These items, recorded on a seven-point agreedisagree format, index the manufacturer's seriousness about dispensing with its rep and setting up a direct salesforce in the near future (two years or less). Cronbach's alpha was computed for each of these scales to demonstrate internal consistency. The estimate is 0.90 for both scales, which is well above the suggested level for basic research (Nunnally 1978) .
To measure the likelihood of terminating the relationship (DEMISE), we computed the maximum of the average from each of the "intentions" scales. Thus, if a firm indicated a high intention to change reps and a low intention to integrate vertically, the score for the intention to change reps was used as the measure of DEMISE. The resulting dependent variable is therefore coded in such a way that high values mean a high likelihood of termination and low values mean a low likelihood of termination. Note that if the sum of these two scales had been used as the measure of DEMISE, a firm that indicated a high intention to change reps and a low intention to integrate vertically would have been penalized relative to a firm for which changing reps and integrating vertically were equally likely.
In measuring the likelihood of terminating the relationship, one could alternatively base the measure on decisions made previously, that is, on actual relationship terminations or explicit decisions not to terminate. However, such an approach may introduce severe problems associated with hindsight bias and rationalizations of prior decisions. For that reason, our research strategy was to measure the intentions of key decision makers in a time frame that captures the relevant planning horizon. Measuring intentions in this context may not be problematic because a manufacturer's decision to terminate a rep is deliberate. Nonetheless, this approach has limitations, which we consider in the Discussion section.
Manufacturer-speciJic Investments. Two forms of company-specific investments were measured: knowledge of the company's idiosyncracies and knowledge of the company's product line. The key feature of these investments is that they are not readily redeployable on behalf of another manufacturer. The measure (MANUF) consists of the mean response from a seven-item rating scale (the response for each item was recorded on a sevenpoint strongly disagreelstrongly agree format). Cronbach's alpha for this scale is 0.88. Customer-speciJic Investments. The measure of customer-specific investments (CUSTOMER) taps the extent to which the rep has made investments in forging a close relationship with customers. The measure is consistent with those used by Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Heide and John (1988) . Cronbach's alpha for this scale is 0.82.
Length of Prior Relationship. This construct is the length of prior relationship between the manufacturer and the rep organization in the selected sales district. Specifically, respondents were asked to provide their best estimate (in terms of days, weeks, months, years, or combinations thereof) as to how long their selected manufacturer's representative had been selling the manufacturer's products in the sales district. The measure (DYADAGE) is the logarithm of the response. The logarithm was used on the assumption that the effect of length of prior relationship is not linear, with prior length having diminishing effects at higher levels (Heide and Miner 1992).
Other Variables. Three other variables were included in the empirical test to account for other possible effects on the likelihood of relationship termination. Hannan and Freeman (1984) indicate that structural inertia, which increases with an organization's age and size, makes it difficult for organizations to change their organizational structure. This effect may have implications for the tendency to end current relationships. We therefore included how long the manufacturer had been in business (MANU-FAGE) and the size of the manufacturer in relation to other electronics manufacturers (SIZE) as variables in the statistical test.
In addition, the performance of the rep (poor, midrange, best) was included as a control variable. We used the code 1 for poor performers, 2 for midrange performers, and 3 for best performers.2
Construct Validity
We tested to determine whether the measures for the two types of transaction-specific investments and the length of prior relationship captured conceptually distinct constructs. We subjected the sets of items for these measures, as well as the scales for the dependent variable, to a conas might be expected given the size of the sample firmatory factor model by using EQS (Bentler 1989) . Spe- (Bagozzi and Yi 1988) . However, Bentler's (1990) comcifically, a model was estimated in which every item was parative fit index (CFI = 0.928) and the average offrestricted to load on its a priori specified factor, and the diagonal standardized residual (AOSR = 0.0379) suggest factors themselves were permitted to correlate (Anderson that the model represents a reasonably good fit to the data. and Gerbing 1988). The overall chi-square statistic for
The complete results for this measurement model (stanthe model is significant (~~( 2 6 8 ) = 594.59, p < 0.001), dardized solution) are reported in Table 2 . Each of the relevant factor loadings is large and significant at the 0.01 level. In sum, the measurement model provides further evidence of unidimensionality for the measures.
To provide evidence of discriminant validity, a series of additional models were estimated in which the individual factor correlations, one at a time, were restricted to unity. Subsequently, the fit of the restricted model was compared with that of the original model. The relevant chi-square difference tests are all significant, providing evidence of discriminant validity (Bagozzi et al. 1991) . For instance, the comparison involving MANUF and CUSTOMER yielded a i12 (1) 
Tests of Hypotheses
The strategy for testing the hypotheses consisted of first estimating a regression model that included only the main effects of the central theoretical variables and the control variables on the likelihood of terminating the relationship. The estimation results for this regression on a sample of 258 manufacturers are shown in Table 3 (Model 1). Next, we estimated a regression model that included the same predictors as the main effects model, as well as the interactions between DYADAGE and the two measures of specific assets. These results are given in Table 3 (Model  2) . Both models were estimated by using mean-centered values of the independent variables. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variable set used in the analyses.
The results for Model 1 provide support for H1 and H2. The likelihood of relationship termination is related significantly and negatively to both the level of manufacturer-specific assets (t = -4.86, p < 0.01) and the level of customer-specific assets (t = -3.82, p < 0.01). The effects of the length of prior relationship and the size-related control variables are not significant. The control variable that represents rep performance, however, is significant and negative (t = -3.65, p < 0.01).
The likelihood of relationship termination is lower for better performing reps.
Terms for the interactions between DYADAGE and the two measures of specific assets were introduced in Model 2. Including these interactions improved the explained variance to a statistically significant degree (F(2,248) = 4.30, p < 0.05). It is noteworthy that the correlations between DYADAGE*MANUF and DY-ADAGE*CUSTOMER in Table 4 , though somewhat high, do not cause problems in interpreting the estimates for the interactions in Model 2. The probability of making a Type I is the same regardless of the level of multicollinearity (Goldberger 1991) . However, high levels of multicollinearity might affect Type I1 errors (i.e., a lack of statistical significance). We found support for H1 in Model 2 (t = -4.90, p < 0.01). Again, the likelihood of relationship termination is related negatively to the level manufacturer-specific assets. H2 is also supported. Specifically, the likelihood of termination is related significantly and negatively to the level of customer-specific assets (t = -3.80, p < 0.01).
In support of H3, with the level of manufacturer-specific assets controlled, the estimate for the interaction between DYADAGE and MANUF is significant and negative (t = -2.7 1, p < 0.0 1). Hence, the likelihood of relationship termination decreases with the rep's manufacturerspecific investments for relationships of longer prior duration. Finally, with the level of customer-specific assets controlled, the estimate for the interaction between DY-ADAGE*CUSTOMER is significant and positive (t = 2.25, p < 0.05), providing support for H4. Increases in the level of the rep's investment in customer transaction-specific assets lead to a higher likelihood of relationship termination for relationships of longer prior d~r a t i o n .~ Finally, the effects of the size-related control variables in Model 2 are not significant. The control variable representing rep performance, however, is both significant and negative. The likelihood of relationship termination is lower for better performing reps (t = -3.50, p < 0.01).
Discussion
Our research examined the extent to which two types of transaction-specific assets and their interactions with the prior length of a relationship influence a manufacturer's intention to terminate a relationship. Our results replicate in an additional setting some prior findings on the influence of transaction-specific investments between two parties directly involved in a relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1989 , Heide and John 1990 , Joskow 1985 . We found that specialized investments by a downstream partner (i.e., a manufacturer's rep) in relationships that are even farther downstream (i.e., customer accounts) can influence a manufacturer's intention to terminate the manufacturer-rep relationship. Moreover, the length of prior relationship between a manufacturer and its rep is shown to moderate these effects.
Our findings suggest that a rep's manufacturer-specific investments tend to increase a manufacturer's switching costs and thereby decrease the manufacturer's intention to terminate the relationship. Such investments also appear to create mutual dependence between the rep and the manufacturer, which aligns their interests and encourages mutual adjustments. Under these conditions the length of prior relationship seems to indicate the opportunity for relational improvements (e.g., increased trust, flexibility, and communication) advocated by sociologists, which further increase switching costs and further decrease the manufacturer's intention to terminate the relationship. Given the empirical support for the hypothesis based on this argument, the theoretical perspectives of transaction cost analysis and sociology can be usefully combined together to explain these types of interorganizational phenomena.
One key contribution of our research is indicated by the results for the effects of customer-specific assets on the manufacturer's intention to terminate the relationship. These types of specific assets are characteristic of distribution channels in that such channels represent the link in relationships between a manufacturer and its customers. We hypothesized that the presence of customerspecific investments can create a condition of asymmetric dependence with the manufacturer in which a bilateral pattern of interaction is less likely to develop. The expectation was that problems associated with a lack of bilateral interaction (e.g., more conflict, less flexibility, more opportunistic behavior) would become more apparent over time (i.e., in relationships of longer prior duration). Such problems would lower the manufacturer's switching cost and increase the likelihood of the manufacturer terminating the relationship. The results support this expectation.
Finally, our results should be interpreted in light of the inherent limitations of the study. First, the use of a behavioral intentions measure rather than an objective behavioral measure may bias our results to the extent that intentions do not adequately capture actual behavior. To corroborate our findings, it would be useful to have data ORGANIZATION 8, NO. 6, showing that managerial decisions were subsequently consistent with our measure of managerial intentions. Such data could be gathered by means of followup questionnaires. Alternatively, a longitudinal study using panel data could be employed, but would be likely to result in a much smaller sample size that would limit the generalizability of the results. Second, our study was conducted with cross-sectional data, so it is not possible to confirm causal relations. A third limitation is the use of only subjective perceptual measures. It would be desirable to have more quantitative measures to substantiate convergent validity for the major constructs. Finally, several other possible explanations for long-term relationships were not investigated and remain open for future inquiry. For example, other interorganizational attachments should be considered, such as the extent of individual attachments (Seabright et al. 1992 ) and the possible mediating role of exchange performance. Acknowledgments 
Endnotes
'sales agents only provide selling services on a commission basis, bear all selling expenses, and do not carry competing lines. They typically represent several complementary product lines. They are not substitutes for distributors because they do not carry inventory, set prices, invoice, ship, or extend credit. 2~h e same pattern of results was found when the statistical tests were conducted with two dummy variables to measure the three levels of rep performance. '~ecause the measure for DYADAGE is ratio scaled and the measures for manufacturer-and customer-specific investments are interval scaled, a test of the significance for the main effect of DYADAGE is not meaningful. However, the tests for the main effects of MANUF and CUSTOMER and their interactions with DYADAGE are meaningful. We thank a reviewer for pointing this out.
